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Abstract
This note raises the issue of whether asymmetry in estimated monetary-policy rules for the
U.S. can be a spurious result due to model specification, rather than a robust feature of the
estimated rules themselves. I estimate standard - linear - Taylor rules, and test for conditional
symmetry using the procedures presented in Bai and Ng (2001a). The results cast doubt on
Taylor rules providing a consistent description of the conduct of the Fed.
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URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2006/volume5/EB-05E40004A.pdf“Pending a more careful and convincing appraisal of the loss function, the goal
of monetary policy ought to be to make approximately symmetrical errors. That is
harder than a more one-sided approach, but whoever said that macroeconomic pol-
icy would be easy?”
Robert M. Solow, in Solow and Taylor (1999)
1 Introduction
The celebrated rule for monetary policy of Taylor (1993) proposes a linear relationship
between the short-term interest rate and a set of aggregate variables including inﬂation
and the output gap. The rule is often used both for describing the historical conduct
of monetary policy (e.g. see Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler, 2000), and for producing policy
advice (e.g. see Gerlach and Schnabel, 1999).
Some recent contributions have proposed asymmetric formulations for the Taylor
rule. Bec, Salem and Collard (2002) and Surico (2002) argue that a nonlinear conditional
mean in the Taylor rule generates a plausible description of the conduct of monetary
policy in the U.S. These studies suggest that monetary policy is more aggressive during
recessions than during cyclical expansions.
ThispaperinvestigatestheextenttowhichasymmetricTaylorrulesareabletocapture
the nonlinear features of the Federal funds rate. In particular, I concentrate on whether
the alleged asymmetry in estimated policy rules is based on features of the data that are
independent from the econometric speciﬁcation of the rules themselves. Hence, I con-
sider the evidence for conditional asymmetry, namely the asymmetric shape of the resid-
uals from alternative Taylor rules. After estimating different models for the conditional
mean, I apply the test developed by Bai and Ng (2001). These tests are asymptotically
distribution-free, retain power in small samples, and can be applied irrespective of the
degree of dependence in the data.
The monetary policy literature proposes different functional forms for the Taylor rule.
Each of them can be derived from theoretical models of optimizing central bank behavior.
The true structural model is unknown to the researcher. However, since both inﬂation and
output are strongly autocorrelated, there are alternative speciﬁcations for the conditional
mean of the Taylor rule that are considered equally valid proxies for the true structural
model. In other words, there are different empirical speciﬁcations for the Taylor rule that
are observationally equivalent.
1The reasoning outlined above suggests that the estimated policy rules should provide
evidence of asymmetry in a way that is uniform across different speciﬁcations of the con-
ditional mean. The results from the tests for conditional asymmetry show that this does
not happen. Alternative speciﬁcations of the Taylor rule generate conﬂicting pictures of
asymmetry in the Federal funds rate. These considerations indicate that Taylor rules are
unable to provide a valid historical account of monetary policy in the U.S.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the statistical tests of Bai and
Ng (2001). Section 3 describes the models for conditional mean based on Taylor rules.
Section 4 deals with the dataset, and section 5 explains the implications of the test results.
Section 6 proposes some ﬁnal remarks.
2 A short overview of tests for conditional symmetry
The null hypothesis of conditional symmetry is tested on an auxiliary parametric model
of the form:
yt = H(Ωt,α) + σ(Ωt,α)εt
where H is the conditional mean, α is the parameter vector, and σ2(Ωt,α) is the condi-
tional variance of yt based on the information set Ωt := {yt−1,...xt,xt−1,...}. There
are no assumptions on either the persistence or the i.i.d. behavior of yt and xt.
Testing for conditional symmetry of yt is equivalent to testing for symmetry of εt
around zero. The test compares the empirical distribution function of the standardized
residuals ˆ εt with that of −ˆ εt:
ˆ ε =
yt − H(˜ Ωt, ˆ α)
σ(˜ Ωt, ˆ α)







[I(εt ≤ z) − I(−εt ≤ z)]
where I(·) is an indicator function. Since WT(z) depends on the difference between the
number of εt and the number of −εt less than or equal to z, it should take small values for
all z under the null of symmetry. This justiﬁes the fact that two types of test statistics can
be constructed, namely one from the positive values of z and the other from the negative
2values.
In the computation of the test statistics, the unobserved error ε is replaced with the
estimated residuals ˆ ε. This implies that the estimated ˆ WT(z) should be used. However,
the limiting distribution of ˆ WT(z) is not asymptotically distribution-free. In order to
avoid this problem, Bai and Ng (2001) construct a martingale transformation. For z ≤ 0,
the following process is computed:






and for z ≥ 0:



























where fT is the estimated density of εt, gT is the estimated g := ˙ f/f, and ˙ f is the
derivative of f.











Each test statistic is asymptotically distributed as sup
0≤s≤1
|B(s)|, where B(s) is a Brownian
motion over [0,1]. Bai and Ng (2001) suggest approximating the integrals with summa-
tions. Both the densities and their derivatives are computed through a Gaussian kernel
with bandwidth 1.06σT −1/5.
33 Taylor rules as models of the conditional mean
Taylor (1993) proposes a simple and yet powerful way of describing the historical behav-
ior of the Federal funds rate in the U.S.:
ffrt = ∆4pt + α1(yt − y
∗) + α2(∆4pt − π
∗) + ffr
∗ + εt
This equation states that the Federal Reserve Board sets the policy rate rt as a function
of the quarterly change in the price level ∆4pt and of the difference between current
output yt and potential output y∗. The central bank responds also to the movements of
both the inﬂation target π∗ and the long-run real rate of interest r∗. Several reﬁnements
have followed, the main one being the forward-looking speciﬁcation of Clarida, Gal´ ı and
Gertler (2000):
ffrt = (1−αR)[α1 (Et[∆4pt+4] − π
∗) + α2Et([yt+q] − y
∗) + ffr
∗]+αRβ(L)ffrt+εt
where E is the expectation operator conditional on the information set at time t. Both
policy rules have a linear functional form. They predict changes of the Federal funds rate
that are symmetric around the long-run targets.
The speciﬁcation proposed by Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (2000) can be derived from
a reduced-form model (e.g. see Svensson, 1997) with a loss function of the central bank
that is quadratic in both inﬂation and the output gap, an aggregate supply and an IS curve
that are linear in each determinant. Although analytically more tractable, the linear-
quadratic framework has been criticized lately.
In the model of Cukierman (2001), the political accountability of the central bank
makes monetary policy decisions vulnerable to the inﬂuence of the government. For the
political authority, the welfare costs of the recessions are larger than the beneﬁts of the
expansions. Thus the government has an incentive to bargain for asymmetric monetary
policy over the business cycle.
3.1 The auxiliary models
This section describes the econometric models that are estimated in order to compute the
ﬁtted residuals ˆ ε. In the empirical exercise I ignore the issues raised by the fact that the
long-run targets of inﬂation and the Federal funds rate are not directly observable. The
4ﬁrst model takes the form of a standard ordinary-least squares (OLS) regression:
ffrt = α0 + απ,1∆4pt−1 + αy,1gapt−1 + εt (1)
This speciﬁcation is generalized to account for both interest-rate inertia and autocorrela-
tion in the other explanatory variables:









αR,iffrt−i + εt (2)
I also consider the nonlinear rule studied by English, Nelson, and Sack (2002), which is
shown to account properly for the smooth behavior of the Federal funds rate:
˜ it = α0 + απ,1∆4pt + αy,1gapt
ffrt = (1 − αR,1)˜ it + αR,1ffrt−1 + εt
(3)
Equation 3 is estimated through nonlinear least squares (NLS). Finally I introduce a
forward-looking variant of the policy of Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (2000):
ffrt = α0 + απ,1E[∆4pt+4|Ωt−1] + αy,1E[yt|Ωt−1] + αR,1ffrt−1 + εt (4)
Models of this form are typically estimated through the generalized method of moments.
However, the results from this type of estimators depend heavily on the set of instruments
used. For this reason, I ignore the issues raised by the selection of instruments. I use a
two-stage least-squares estimator with instruments based on time t − 1 information.
4 The data
The dataset includes quarterly observations and covers the period 1954(7)-2004(5). The
source is the FRED II Database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The series
for the Federal funds rate is constructed by taking simple averages of monthly data. I
compute the output gap as the percentage deviation of current output yt from potential ¯ yt:
gapt = (yt − ¯ yt)/¯ yt. The inﬂation rate is calculated as the four-quarter difference of the
implicit price deﬂator of gross domestic product.
Before estimating the policy rules, all the series are tested for unit roots through the
statistical procedures proposed by Perron and Ng (1996, 2001). These tests retain good
power properties in small samples. Table 1 shows that the null of a unit-root is hard to
5reject for the Federal funds rate. The evidence of non-stationarity of the Federal funds
rate precludes the possibility of testing this series for unconditional symmetry.
5 Results
The Taylor rules described in section 3.1 are estimated through a general-to-speciﬁc ap-
proach for the choice of the lag structure. The statistical properties of the estimated
policy rules are broadly consistent with those of previous studies. Most of the coefﬁ-
cients are signiﬁcant at standard conﬁdence levels, and are of a magnitude comparable
to that of well-established estimates (see Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler, 2000). The apparent
heteroscedasticity of the residuals arises from outliers that are not captured by the condi-
tional means. The normality assumption can be rejected for the residuals of most of the
models.
Table 2 reports the results from the tests for conditional symmetry. As mentioned
earlier, the Taylor rules used as conditional mean models reﬂect the idea of symmetric
movements of the policy rates around the natural rate of interest. If the Federal funds rate
was proved to be unconditionally asymmetric, the contrasting results for the full sample
across rules would indicate which speciﬁcation of the Taylor rule fails to capture properly
the shape of the distribution of the Federal funds rate. However, we do not know whether
the level of the Federal funds rate exhibits unconditional symmetry. And even if we did,
we should consider that it could still be possible for a series to display unconditional
symmetry and conditional asymmetry at the same time (see Bai and Ng, 2001). In the
end, the only logical way of interpreting the outcome of the tests is that of searching for
conditional asymmetry as a spurious result.
The conditional means of equations 1 and 2 are associated with evidence of condi-
tional asymmetry only for the post-Volcker period. The forward-looking rule 4 produces
mild support for conditional asymmetry over the full sample. The introduction of the
lagged Federal funds rate as an explanatory variable does not change the asymmetric be-
havior of the residuals in the backward-looking model. The view on asymmetry from the
forward-looking rule 4, instead, is strongly affected by the inclusion of a term of interest-
rate smoothing. Unlike the other speciﬁcations, model 4 without lags of the Federal funds
rate detects no conditional asymmetry for the post-Volcker period.
66 Conclusion
This note applies the tests of conditional symmetry proposed by Bai and Ng (2001) to
the residuals of estimated monetary policy rules for the U.S. economy. The results are
sensitive both to the type of explanatory variables included — backward-looking and
forward-looking — and to the estimation method used — OLS/NLS and instrumental
variables. The apparent conditional asymmetry of the Federal funds rate is not a robust
feature of alternative formulations of the Taylor rule. These ﬁndings suggest that condi-
tional asymmetry is a spurious result. This casts some serious doubt on the capability of
Taylor rules to provide a consistent description of U.S. monetary policy.
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Legend: Results without brackets are based on a constant only. The ﬁgures in brackets are com-
puted from models with both a constant and a linear time trend. The Phillips-Perron test is de-
scribed in Phillips and Perron (2000), the modiﬁed Phillips-Perron are all outlined in Perron and
Ng (1996), the point-optimal test is from Elliott and Stock (1996) and is amended in Perron and
Ng (2001) together with the test of Sargan and Bhargava (1983). The distinction between GLS
and OLS detrending can be found in Perron and Ng (2001). All the tests: *signiﬁcant at the 5%
level.
9Table 2: Test results for conditional symmetry
Model 1
Full sample Pre-Volcker Post-Volcker
[1954(3):1979(3)] [1983(1):2004(1)]
CS 1.545 0.777 3.887*
CS+ 1.545 0.548 2.103***
CS− 1.149 0.777 3.887*
Model 2
Full sample Pre-Volcker Post-Volcker
[1954(3):1979(3)] [1983(1):2004(1)]
CS 1.139 0.739 2.414**
CS+ 1.139 0.739 1.735
CS− 0.971 0.605 2.414**
Model 3
Full sample Pre-Volcker Post-Volcker
[1954(4):1979(3)] [1983(1):2004(1)]
CS 2.401** 0.789 2.885*
CS+ 0.893 0.789 1.340
CS− 2.401** 0.788 2.885*
Model 4 with no interest-rate smoothing
Full sample Pre-Volcker Post-Volcker
[1954(4):1979(3)] [1983(1):2004(1)]
CS 2.420** 2.431** 1.283
CS+ 2.420** 1.444 1.283
CS− 0.927 2.431** 1.205
Model 4 with interest-rate smoothing
Full sample Pre-Volcker Post-Volcker
[1954(4):1979(3)] [1983(1):2004(1)]
CS 3.153* 1.408 2.294**
CS+ 0.510 1.120 1.182
CS− 3.153* 1.408 2.294**
Legend: The critical values for the test statistics are 2.78, 2.21 and 1.91 at the 1%, 5% and 10%
signiﬁcance levels respectively. The tests are based on the full of conditional symmetry. All the
tests: *rejection at the 1% level; **rejection at the 5% level; ***rejection at the 10% level.
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